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PERSPECTIVES ON YOUTHF JL DEVIANCE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICIES
By: Albert S. Alissi
Associate Professor of Social Work
University of Connecticut
School of Social Work
West Hartford, Connecticut
The way a society deals with its younger deviants reflects the place
assigned to youth in hat society. In his famous study of European family
life, Phillippe Aries pointed out that for centruies children shared the
same status as adults and were mixed with adults as soon as they were weaned
from their mothers at about the age of seven. And so it was possible that
in England in 1801, a child of thirteen was hanged for stealing a spoon.
A girl of seven was publicly hanged in 1808 p.d a boy of nine was hanged
as late as 1831 for setting fire to a house. But insofar as a childhood
status was afforded to the young in early America, the puritans turned their
"rude, stubborn and unrujy children" over to Masters who would "force them
to submit to government" In New York in the early 1800's it was declared
that "If a child be found destitute- if abandoned by its parents-or
suffered to lead a vicious or vagrant ife; or if convicted of any crime,
it may be sent to the House of Refuge" And, as Anthony Platt observed,
the child saving movement which helped initiate the juvenile court at the
turn of the century actually invented large categories of delinquency which
had up to that time been handled more or less informally. The new reforms
in effect imposed sanctions on conduct unbecoming youth and in effect "sought
to disqualify youth from enjoying adult privileges"5'.
Measured against this background of changing perspectives the relative-
ness of our own approach to youthful deviance is particularly evident. Obvious-
ly, the way youth are treated depends largely on how they are perceived and
how their behavior is defined. It would follow that the determination of
sound policies must rest on an understanding of the processes underlying
these perceptions and definitions. This paper will deal with some of these
processes and policies in light of the current labeling perspective on
deviance.
Although it may be difficult to acknowledge, we never see things in
their total concreteness. We see only certain aspects-those that we have
been taught to abstract using the currency of our own cultural symbols. As
Walter Lippman expressed in his famous aphorism, "First we look, then we
name, and only then do we see." It is in the naming or defining of behavior
that we come to "see" or appreciate it as significant for we do not respond
to stimulii but rather to our definitions of the stimulii but rather to our
definitions of the stimulii. Inasmuch as our behavioral defintions have
established cultural connotations, what we see or overlook depends in the
final analysis on the concepts our culture provides.
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What passes for knowledge and understanding then must center on
how we arrive at these definitions. In exploring the sociology of know-
ledge, Manheim introduced the notion of relationism which held that truth
is not necessarily a fixed commodity but is predicated on the historical
and situational context in which it is found. As cross cultural studies
reveal, our own involvement and narrowed frame-of-reference institutional-
izes varying versions of the truth. And, any frame of reference is subject
to time and place distortions.
Hence, the early social pathologists, as social reformers, reacted
with moral indignation against non-conforming, disruptive and negative
behavior. Strongly influenced by their faith in natural law, small town
and middle class ideologies they simply assumed that social problems result-
ed not from defects in the existing institutions but from the acts of ingi-
viduals who were seen to be either "dependent, defective or delinquent" *
The social disorganization theorists later moved away from such philosophi-
cal pronouncements and held that deviant activities arose from the absence,
inadequacies or ineffectiveness of social rules and norms. And then "con-
flict" theorists, representing still another view believed that deviance
was not so much a response to externally imposed values as it was a reflec-
tion of a differing set of values.
Increasingly, we are recognizing that deviant behavior is not
exclusively the outcome of disruptive and disorganized forces in society
but reflects the normal social processes of control which account for
conventional behavior as well. Structural functionalists maintain that
the normal strains which exist in the social order create conditions of
anomie whereby large segments of the population are disproportionately
influenced towards deviant adaptations. Meanwhile, labeling theorists
in the symbolic interractionalism tradition have focussed on the normal
social processes which define, label and articulate negative societal
reactions which in a sense contribute to further deviant responses.
Deviancy in this view cannot be separated from the interpersonal context
in which it is defined.
Each of us has his own set of concepts and related assumptions
regarding the young and the definition of youthful deviance varies accord-
ingly. The labeling perspective will be considered further inasmuch as
it is particularly suited for exploring the processes which affect these
definitions.
Basically, the labeling perspective sets forth a set of assumptions
about how people define situations. It is concerned with the societal pro-
cesses whereby a community or society comes to define certain kinds of
behavior as deviant, the nature of the labels that get applied, and the
consequent actions and reactions of those being labeled as well as those
doing the labeling.
It was Howard Becker who made explicit the emphasis on labeling
in his often quoted statement that:
0 . . social groups create deviance by making the rules whose
infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying these rules
to particular people and labeling them as outsiders. From
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this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the
person commits, but rather a consequence of the application
by others of rules and sanctions to an "offender." The
deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied;
deviant behavior is behavior that people so label.f "
Lemert8.provided an early systematic theory of deviance which held
that negative societal reactions played a prominent role in determining
deviant behavior. The deviant person in this view is "one whose status,
function and self-definition" are influenced and changed by the degree
of deviance engaged in, by the nature of its visability and by the kind
of response it brings about. Similarly, "the critical variable in the
study of deviance" was seen by Kai Erikson to be, "the social audience
rather than individual person, since it is the audience which eventually
decides whether or not any given action or actions will be come a visible
case of deviation"'
In assessing others, humans tend to yngle out and categorize certain
features of behavior into what John Lofland * refers to as "pivotal cate-
gories" which define persons and locate their essential status. People by
their actions are identified and dealt with in terms of their imputed pivotal
status. Since life is too complex for each of us to be able to correlate
all the categories to identify and describe what kinds of people do what
kinds of things, consistency specialistis - otherwise known as behavioral
scientists- emerge to keep track of such correlations. Their job is to
show the rest of us what kinds of people engage in delinquent acts, takyl"
drugs, become members of delinquent subcultures, masterbate, and so on.
The use of the pivotal category called "delinquent" is not arbitrarily
determined but baries to the extent that persons are prepared to impute the
category to others. The public is encouraged to recognize categorie?2of
deviance through what has been described as a moral entrepreneurship on
the part of some people who, being convinced that a certain "deviant: exists,
mobilize efforts to influence others to recognize his evil character and
to do something about it.
Again, the man in the street has relatively little time to iqlntify
deviants effectively. This is left to the imputational specialists ' who
are specially trained to code and impute meaning to behavior. The growing
army of social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists school teachers and
police in a sense insure the flow of imputations of deviance for their
training alerts and prepares them to identify and detect deviants. Moreover,
it is likely that as the number of imputational specialists increases, the
number of people imputed to be deviant also increases.
The labeling school has not been without its critics.14 . Some have
questioned, for example, its theoretical status and prefer to see it as a
frame-of-reference which tends to champion the underdog and j'flects what
Becker acknowledges to be an unconventional sentimentality" " Indeed,
if it is a theory, it is not entirely clear whether it is meant to explain
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deviance or reactions to deviance. Questions have also been raised regard-
ing how much societal reaction is necessary to bring about a definition
of deviancy, the nature of reciprocity involved and whether it is possible
to have deviancy at all where the act is secretive and out of the view
of others. It has been contended furthermore that the labeling perspective
enters the fits well the sociology of the interesting in that the ideas
advanced are sometimes considered gr~t not because they are true but
because they are simply interesting. Labeling theorists have also been
criticized for viewing deviancy in relatively passive terms and for their
failure to take note of the more aggressiy , political and group responses
to and the counter application of labels.
Whatever its shortcomings, for our purposes the labeling perspective
does focus attention not so much on the individual child or youth but on
the contest in which youthful behavior is being judged and acted upon. And,
the emphasis on societal reactions suggests new insights regarding the role
played by an informal and formal agencies not only in counteracting but also
in initiating and sustaining the very deviance they set out to eliminate.
We turn now to a brief overview of some of the more salient features
of our official approaches to juvenile delinquency.
The Official ApprQch to Juvenile Delinquency: According to the President's
Task Force Report- on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, one out of
every nine children and one out of every six boys will be referred to the
juvenile court sometime prior to their eighteenth birthdate. Self reports
indicate also that perhaps 90 percent of all young people have committed
at least one act which could have brought them before the juvenile court.
Official intervention appears to be a universal threat to all children al-
though the detection and disposition of offenders seems clearly to be biased
to reflect wide discretion by the imputational specialists. Inasmuch
as teachers, social workers, policemen and judges do reflect public attitudes
and social class values, it is not surprising to find that "delinquency"
rates are disproportionately higher among urban poor, among blacks and among
those who are viewed to have "family and personal problems".
The most significant feature of our juvenile criminal justice system
is its legal "overreach" or overcriminalization evidenced in the continued
search for legal means to solve what are essentially socio-personal problems.
As currently conceived, the definition of delinquency includes not only
criminal behavior which is punishable if committed by an adult but also a
wide range of so-called juvenile status crimes including truancy, incorri-
gibility, being in danger of living an immoral life, growing up in idleness,
etc., which are illegal or objectionable only with reference to children.
As interpreted by Anthony Platt, the juvenile court continues to
further the middle class biases of the early child saving movement. Dominated
by women who were the "moral entrepreneurs" of the day, the child savers
brought attention to and actually invented now categories of conduct which
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in the process "consolidated the inferior social status and dependency
of lower class youthlenying them the capacity for initiative, responsi-
bility and autonomy"
The disposition of those adjudicated to be delinquent by virtue of
their childhood status differs little from those who have committed criminal
acts. A national census of the almost 60,000 youths incarcerated in the
722 institutions throughout the country revealed for example that one out
of every four boys and thremOout of every four girls were being detained
because of status offenses.
Any chain of behavior can be imputed so that a child may come under
the jurisdiction of the court. One California judge arguing for the reten-
tion of juvenile court jurisdiction over simple juvenile traffic violations
illustrated this when he stated:
that the broad powers of the juvenile court can be helpfully
invoked on behalf of children whose maladjustment has been
brought to light through juvenile traffic violations. A girl
companion of a youthful speeder may be protected from further
sexual (sic) experimentation. Boys whose only amusement seems to
be joyriding in family cars can be directed to other more suitable
forms of entertainment before they reach2 he stage of "borrowing
cars when the family car is unavailable.
One negative consequence of this overreach is reflected in the tendency
of parents, school teachers and other adults to expect the courts to solve
problems which they cannot deal with. Legal definitions, however, tend to
be arbitrary artificial and insensitive to the needs of growing children.
In effect, recourse to the law narrows considerably the range of diversity
permitted youth insofar as prescriptions for conduct tend to be universal
and denies important ethnic and cultural variations.
The origins of the juvenile court in America has been compared to
the "chaplain's prayer that opens a political convention, graceful and al- "
together unexceptional, but hardly determinative of subsequent proceedings"22
The cuurt early sought to provide a special type of protection and treatment
for juveniles. Through it the child was no longer to be accused of a crime,
but was to be offered assistance and guidance; there was to be no stigma
or record concerning criminal guilt; hearings were to be informal and held
in private. In short, the court would give youth an advantage which
would in the words of the early founders "protect its least fortunate
junior citizens".
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Ironically, it is this same set of conditions which today have
raised the most significant legal issues regarding lac 3of procedural
rights for children as revealed in the Gault Decision To be
sure, the struggle today seems more intent on providing equal protection
to the young to say nothing of the advantages the procedures were designed
to provide. As Justice Fortas pointed out "..there may be grounds for
concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds; that he gets
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the 2 olicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children."
In general, our approach to delinquency is based on the over-riding
assumption that children and youth are basically incompetent and not entirely
responsible for their own behavior. The problem is presumed to lie with
the child as it is further assumed that the state through its long established
institutions does have the capacity and clear mandate for socializing the
young.
Paul Goodman 25 cites an intriging study which revealed how younger
children learned to use gymnasium apparatus under differing conditions.
When older children were present and in a sense provided an audience,
accidents were frequent; and when adults were present, there were fewer
accidents but some children did not participate and some did not learn the
apparatus. And interestingly enough when the children were left alone,
all of them learned and there were no accidents.
There is some historical evidence that children, preadolescents
and adolescents at least in crises situations ca96create their own societies
and realize their potential for self-regulation. The Russian Civil
War orphans in the early 1920's for example were forced to fight for physical
survival after their parents and relatives had been killed. These youths
did indeed organize their lives effectively and survived by preying on the
rest of society. Similarly, a spontaneous organization of children five
years of age and older emerged in the wake of the Columbia Civil War in
the early 1950's. These children effectively managed to form gangs compos-
ed of smaller social living units which learned to exist against the rest
of society.
In many ways youths today prefer to be non-participants of the past
and have become dropouts from history. In spite of the pamperings, briberies,
put-downs, tongue-laskings, and promises of a bright shining future, youths
are refusing to reenact the past and ma 7 not even desire to keep the system
in tack. They are what Leslie Fiedler 7 refers to as "the new mutants"
who face life with a new logic of its own. In contrast to his earlier counter-
part, today's youths often feels no need to hide or disguise his rebellious
deeds out of defense for god and motherhood. His escapades contribute directly
to the growing inferiority complex and amateur status of his parents.
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Perhaps our post-industrial society has signaled th 8beginning of a
still more profound revelation which in Margaret Mead's view represents
an entirely new cultural stage in our history. Beginning with a post-
figurative cultural stage where children learned primarily from their
forbears, and moving to a configurative culture in which both children
and adults learned from their peers, we are now entering a pre-figurative
culture in which adults learn also from their children. Whereas in the
past, the older generation could lend experience to guide youth through
life, today's elders aannot provide this help because there are no guides.
Youth thus take on a new authority in dealing with what is a mutually un-
known future.
June Bingham states the problem in what are perhaps more personal terms
when she states:
Those now over 40 were often burdened by their
late Victorian and pre-Freudian parents with a
harsh conscience, a tendency to overblame them-
selves. They were sandwiched between a generation
that questioned too little and a generation that
questions too much. They themselves never had the
white meat of the turkey. When they were children,
the best parts were being saved, as a matter of
course, for the adults; by the time they grew up,
the best parts were being saved, as a matter of
course, for the children. Having been children in
an adult-centered worq, they are now adults in a
child centered world" "
Implications for Determining Policy: In concluding this discussion, at
least three major policy directions will be briefly considered. The first
concerns policies aimed at narrowing considerably the range of juvenile
acts which come under the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts with a
corresponding diversion of cases to non-legal welfare agencies. The
second reflects the need to reinforce judicial procedures to safeguard
children's rig~s and insure due process of law for those accused of'
criminal acts. The third more broadly takes into account the inter-
ractional context in which youthful deviance occurs and argues for modi-
fying social institutions to provide for a new and more responsible involve-
ment of youth in society.
Clearly, policies need to be redirected so as to eliminate many of'
the poorly defined vague and non-criminal actions of youth from under the
jurisdiction of the courts. Basically this calls for dropping juvenile
status offenses and separating out for differential treatment the cases
of dependency and neglect from the more narrowly defined set of delinquent
acts. The courts would then be more properly used as an adjudicatory
structure to deal with children whose alleged acts would be criminal if
committed by an adult. The courts, in other words, should no longer be
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used to regulate and control the moral behavior of youth. Norval Morris,
in arguing for the elimination of victimless crimes, made the point most
pointedly when stated, "It is improper impolitic and socially harmful
for the criminal law to act the moral busybody3 0 to intervene in or attempt
to govern the private conduct of the citizens 
30.
This recommendation has found considerable support. Acknowledging
the ineffectiveness of the juvenile court system, the President's Task
Force Report recommended the complete elimina on from the court's juris-
diction of conduct illegal only for children. Lemert in the same report
held that the only defensible philosophy for the juvenile courts is one
of judicious non-interen on with the courts remaining the "agency of 1st
last resort for children" ' Similar, Schur in recognizing the harmful
effects of delinquency labeling advances the concept of radical non-inte54
vention and flatly states that we "leave kids alone whereever possible." J
And finally, the Child Welfare Leagu 25of America in its National Policy
statement on the Rights of Children recognized the courts as the only
legal authority that may limit or terminate parental rights,transfer legal
custody of children, appoint guardians, grant adoption decrees, or commit
children. But again the report held that the jurisdiction of the courts
should extend only to those cases which would be subject to prosecution
if committed by adults, while other juvenile offenses should be reserved
for appropriate child welfare agencies.
Any effort to modify court jurisdiction and delinquency statues must
also provide for the diversion of those children who will continue to need
help for a variety of problems. Such problems as are often reflected in
runaways, truancy, drug abuse, sexual experimentation could more effectively
be defined as child welfare problems. To be sure the failure of governmental
authorities to deal adequately with the full range of child welfare concerns
and the limited involvement and accountability of the private agencies in
the past resulted in a larger voice by police, courts and correctional
authorities in the handling of juveniles in trouble. A renewed effort
will have to be made to insure that the network of child welfare agencies
is better equipped to handle children diverted to them. Somehow child
welfare agencies must learn to provide programs which would eliminate the
negative labeling and qmpulsory mandates which have met with obvious
failures in the past. *
Closely related to proposals which would narrow the reach of the
juvenile courts and provide for greater diversity of youthful behavior,
is the attention which should be given to insure uniform treatment and
constitutional safeguards for children accused of committing criminal
acts. Although there are age differentials just as there are other
extenuating circumstances which need to be considered in any judicial
proceding, neither the childhood status of the accused nor the presumed
superior parental wisdom of the judge can justify procedures which violate
basic individual rights.
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The juvenile criminal justice system can no longer deny children their
rights. Procedures which have been adopted to protect the so-called "best
interests of the child" are more a myth than reality. Much too 2ten this
has led to unfair unconstitutional, and even inhumane treatment.
While the ultimate source of change will come through legislation and
judicial innovation, public expectations need somehow to be modified to
accept a much more limited and formalized role for the courts. The public
needs to be reconvinced if it is not already convinced, that the court
should be engaged in that which it knows best-administering justice-
and not practicing psychiatry, social work, family counseling which can
be better provided by other service agencies. Schur put it bluntly when
he stated that what wg needed was "uniformly applied punishment not dis-
guised as treatment." *
A final policy area is concerned with the broader interractional
and structural aspects which give rise to definitions of deviance. As
long as people play an influential role in creating the context for
defining, labeling, and otherwise dealing with delinquent offenders, they
must bear responsibility for modifying or reversing the self-defeating
aspects of their activities. We should not overlook the obvious fact that
the labelled deviants find it difficult to engage normally in a society
which refuses to provide them with viable social statuses and role alter-
natives. The very processes which are responsible for the articulation
of deviant behavior must also be re-engaged to ameliorate that behavior.
A few weeks ago, a special President* l Panel released a report
entitled, "Youth Transition to Adulthood" ' which concluded that young
people ought to have more interaction with adults; that they should be
given greater chances to work and learn outside the formal established
school system and that they should take on more responsibility not only
for themselves but also for others as well.
Implementing these recommendations will not be easy. Our society
is structured in accordance with our outmoded ways of thinking about
one another. And out incapacity to learn to think differently leads to
the suppression of some of our most vital elements. The rebellion of
youth, for example, is mostly seen as a threat to an established order
essential to the well-being of adults. Yet, it is through the process of
rebelling that ts adolescent asserts his own self-identity and makes his
life meaningful. ' We need social policies which encourage adults to
recognize the wider diversity of behavior and accept youthful "upheavals"
as natural events in the resolution of identity crisis.
This undoubtedly calls for educational programs aimed at confronting
the negative societal reactions which emerge among adults and the counter
actions of youth which tend to strain relations and cloud real issues.
It would suggest institutionalizing conflicts through providing new oppor-
tunities for debate and shared problem solving activities in significant
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arenas where community standards influence the behavior of youths. In
the process, youth would be encouraged to "invent" significant roles for
themselves and most importantly participate in society in ways that matter.
What is being recommended here in no small way calls for revamping
existing institutions to more effectively accommodate the needs of the
young. It affects families, schools, work, politics-all of which, our
experience tells us, are not easily changed. To do less, however, would
miss the point entirely. References
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